Abstract. We formalize in a theorem prover the notion of provable anonymity. Our formalization relies on inductive definitions of message distinguishing ability and observational equivalence on traces observed by the intruder. Our theory differs from its original proposal and essentially boils down to the inductive definition of distinguishing messages with respect to a knowledge set for the intruder. We build our theory in Isabelle/HOL to achieve a mechanical framework for the analysis of anonymity protocols. Its feasibility is illustrated through two case studies of the Crowds and Onion Routing protocols.
Introduction
With the rapid growth of the Internet community and the rapid advances in technology over the past decades, people are getting used to carry out their daily activities through networked distributed systems providing electronic services to users. In these systems, people become more and more concerned about their privacy and how their personal information have been used. Typically, anonymity is a desired property of such systems, referring to the ability of a user to own some data or take some actions without being tracked down. This property is essential in systems that involve sensitive personal data, like electronic auctions, voting, anonymous broadcasts, file-sharing and etc. For example, users want to keep anonymous when they visit a particular website or post their political opinions on a public bulletin board. 1 Note that this article is a revised and extended version of [LP11] that appears in the proceedings of the 6th International Conference on Availability, Reliability and Security. In this paper, we have developed a new notion of alignment between two message sequences. Combining the alignment requirement with the observational equivalence between two messages, we have proposed an improved definition of observational equivalence between two traces, which in turn leads to a revised formalization of provable anonymity in Isabelle/HOL. Thus, our framework can incorporate the concept of reinterpretation function which is extensively used in [GHPvR05] . We have extended the case study on Onion Routing accordingly, and conducted a new case study on Crowds. As a consequence of the new notion of alignment, we also devote an additional subsection to prove the alignment requirement on observational equivalence between traces in the case study on Onion protocols. One of our previous work [LP13] also adopts an inductive approach to formalizing the strand space theory and implements the mechanical proof framework in Isabell/HOL. More specifically, the semantics of a protocol session is inductively formalized as a bundle in a strand space in [LP13] , and classic trace properties such as secrecy and authentication are studied. In this work, the semantics of a protocol session is inductively formalized as a trace as well. Different from [LP13] , our inductive approach is further developed to decide observational equivalence according to the adversary's knowledge obtained in two separate sessions, which is essential for defining anonymity properties.
Presentation of the paper. In this paper, we assume readers have some knowledge with Isabelle/HOL syntax. Therefore, we present our formalization directly without elaborated explanation. Notably, a function in Isabelle/HOL syntax is usually defined in a curried form instead of a tuple form, that is, we often use the notation f x y to stand for f (x , y). We also use the notation [[A 1 ; A 2 ; ...; A n ]] ⇒ B to mean that with assumptions A 1 , . . . , A n , we can derive a conclusion B . Here, we briefly introduce some functions on lists, which will be used in later sections of the paper: x #xs for the list that extends xs by adding x to the front of xs, [x 1 , ..x n ] for a list x 1 #..x n #[], xs@ys for the result list by concatenating xs with ys, xs!i for the i th element of the list xs (counting from 0 as the first element), set xs for the set of all the elements in xs, length xs for the length of the list xs, last xs for the last element of the list xs, zip xs ys for the functions which zips two lists xs and ys to generate a list of pairs, and map f xs for the function which applies f to each element in xs. More information on our choices of notations can be found in the appendix. Structure of the paper. Section 2 summarizes related papers in the literature. Section 3 provides a preliminary introduction to notations and terminologies. Distinguishability and observational equivalence of messages are formally defined in Sect. 4. Then we introduce the notion of alignment for two sequences of messages in Sect. 5. Observational equivalence of traces is formally defined in Sect. 6. Epistemic operators and formalization of anonymity properties are presented in Sect. 7 . We model and analyze Crowds and Onion Routing in Sects. 8 and 9, respectively. We conclude the paper in Sect. 10.
Related work
In this section, we summarize existing papers which are mostly related to our work. Besides the inherence and extension from the work on provable anonymity, our work is related to the work by Abadi and Cortier [AR07] . They introduce a notion of pattern equivalence which is also inductively defined to identify the observational equivalence between messages w.r.t. a set of keys. Furthermore, the equivalence corresponds to computationally indistinguishable ensembles. This definition is somehow restricted as the set of keys is only allowed to be symmetric, mainly because they focus on the computational soundness of the symbolic verification.
Another similar but more general, notion of message indistinguishability is static equivalence introduced in the applied pi calculus [Bau05, AC06] . Cryptographic primitives can be modeled using equational theory, thus more primitives can be incorporated in the framework, such as digital signature, XOR, etc. However this scheme is based on the applied pi calculus and cannot be easily formalized in a theorem prover.
More recently, the paper [CCP13] studies process equivalence with length tests with respect to both passive and active intruders. A tool is developed for proving trace equivalence between two processes for a bounded number of sessions, based on the decision procedure of [CCLD11] . In addition, the tool ProVerif [Bla01] can check observational equivalence defined in the applied pi calculus automatically [BAF08, CB13] with respect to active intruders. But it is not guaranteed to terminate and poses some restriction on the structure of processes.
In the literature, a proof method for checking branching bisimilarity [FP03, FPv06] is formalized in the theorem prover PVS. But this approach cannot be directly applied for security protocol analysis (see e.g., [Pan02] ) as it does not deal with message indistinguishability. Trace anonymity [SS96] is formalized using I/O automaton and the Larch prover is employed for check trace anonymity [KMST07] . An anonymous fair exchange e-commerce protocol that is claimed to satisfy customer's anonymity is analyzed by the OTS/CafeOBJ method [KOCF08] following the approach proposed in [KMST07] . However, these two works only consider a weaker intruder, which does not have the same ability to distinguish message sequences as we consider in this paper.
Preliminaries

Agents, messages and events
Agents send or receive messages. There are three kinds of agents: the server, the honest agents, and the spy. Formally the type of agent is defined as follows:
We use bad to denote the set of intruders, which at least includes the agent Spy. If an agent A is not in bad, then A is honest.
The set of messages is defined using the following BNF notation:
where A is an element from agents, N and k from natural. We use k −1 to denote the inverse key of k for brevity. MPair h 1 h 2 is called a composed message. Crypt k h represents the encryption of message h with k .
In an asymmetric key protocol model, an agent A has a public key pubK A, which is known to all agents, and a private key priK A. pubK A is the inverse key of priK A, and vice versa. In a symmetric key model, each agent A has a long-term symmetric key shrK A. The inverse key of shrK A is itself. We also assume that (1) asymmetric keys and symmetry keys are disjoint; (2) the functions shrK, pubK and priK are injective, e.g., if shrK A shrK A then A A . In the following, we abbreviate Crypt k h as {|h|} k , and MPair h 1 . . . MPair h n−1 h n as {|h 1 , . . . , h n−1 , h n |}. Such abbreviations are supported in Isabelle/HOL by syntax translation [NPW02] .
Operators parts, analz, and synth are inductively defined on a message set H . Their definitions are taken from [Pau98] and tailored for our purposes. Usually, H contains a penetrator's initial knowledge and all messages sent by regular agents. The set parts H is obtained from H by repeatedly adding the components of compound messages and the bodies of encrypted messages. Formally, parts H is the least set including H and closed under projection and decryption. inductive set parts:: "msg set⇒msg set" for H:: "msg set" where Inj [intro]: "x∈ H ⇒ x∈ parts H" |Fst: "{|x,y|} ∈ parts H ⇒ x∈ parts H" |Snd: "{|x,y|} ∈ parts H ⇒ y∈ parts H" |Body: "Crypt k x∈ parts H ⇒ x∈ parts H"
The parts operator can be used to define the subterm relation : h 1 h 2 ≡ h 1 ∈ parts{h 2 }. Note that k is not considered as occurring in {|g|} k unless k is a part of g.
Similarly, analz H is defined to be the least set including H and closed under projection and decryption by known keys. Note that we use invKey k to formally denote the inverse key of Key k in our formalization. The set used evs formalizes the notion of freshness. The set includes the set of the parts of the messages sent in the network as well as all messages held initially by any agent. 
Obviously, if single valued r , then a function f from the domain of r to range of r can be derived by f x y if (x , y) ∈ r ; otherwise f x x . If single valued r −1 also holds, then such f is a bijection.
Next we define a set of special lists: distinctList. If tr ∈ distinctList, i , j < length tr , and i j , then we have tr i tr j . Here, tr i is the i -th element of the list tr . Namely, two elements of tr are different.
inductive set distinctList::('a list) set where nilDiff:
Intruder model
We discuss anonymity properties based on observations of the intruder. In this section, we explain our intruder model. Dolev-Yao intruder model [DY83] is considered standard in the field of formal symbolic analysis of security protocols. In this model the network is completely under the control of the intruder: all messages sent on the network are read by the intruder; all received messages on the network are created or forwarded by the intruder; the intruder can also remove messages from the network. However, in the analysis of anonymity protocols, often a weaker attacker model is assumed-the intruder is passive in the sense that he observes all network traffic, but does not actively modify the messages or inject new messages. Therefore, we only need one kind of event Says A B x in our theory, which means that A sends a message x to B , and B receives the message. This semantics is subtly different from [Pau98] , where A intends to send a message x to B , but B does not necessarily receive the message. Besides, the intruder can analyze the messages that he has observed, which is modeled by the operator analz. In the later sections on case studies, we will point out that some anonymity properties cannot be kept if we have the Dolev-Yao intruder model instead. Contrary to the intruder, the regular agents are not necessarily aware of all the events. We adopt the convention that they only see the events in which they are involved as either sender or receiver. According to the above arguments, we can formalize the notion of visible part of a trace. 
Message distinguishability
In this section, we focus on modeling the ability for an agent to distinguish two received messages based on his knowledge. In principle, an agent can uniquely identify any plain-text message he observes. Furthermore, an agent can distinguish any encrypted message for which he possesses the decryption key, or which he can construct himself. 1. Both k 1 and k 2 are in K n, x and y are in K n as well, and the agent can distinguish x and y, then he can tell the difference between m and m as he knows that m and m are different encrypted messages containing different plain texts. 2. Both k 1 and k 2 are in K n, x , y are in K n as well, and the agent can distinguish k 1 and k 2 but not x and y, then he also can tell the difference between m and m as he knows that m and m are different messages encrypted by different keys. 3. Both x and k 1 are in K n, and the agent knows that he can construct m from x and k 1 . However, either y or k 2 is not in K n. The agent can also tell the difference between m and m as m can be constructed by himself, but m cannot be constructed by himself.
2 ∈ K n, and the agent can distinguish x and y, then he also can tell the difference between m and m as he knows that m and m can be decrypted into different messages by using k 
(Crypt k' n') inductive set Diff:: "msg set ⇒ (msg×msg) set" Note that rules CryptDiff3 and CryptDiff4 are two symmetric subcases of case 3, and rules DecryptDiff2 and DecryptDiff3 are two subcases of case 5.
In this paper, when we discuss Diff Kn, we always assume that Kn is a closure set under the analz and then synth operators. Namely, Kn synth (analz Kn) for some message set Kn which is directly observed from network traffics.
Example 1 Let m
{ |Nonce n|} pubK B , and m { |Nonce n |} pubK B , with n n . We also assume Kn synth (analz{Key (priK B ), m, m }). We have (m, m ) ∈ Diff Kn by applying rule basic and rule CryptDiff.
In Example 1, the two messages m and m are two encrypted messages by the same key pubK B , if the key pubK B is in Kn, then the two messages can be decrypted and distinguished.
In Example 2, as priK B , m 0 and m 0 are in Kn, thus Nonce n ∈ Kn and Nonce n ∈ Kn. The conditions n 0 n and n 0 n eliminate the possibility of the case when Nonce n 0 ∈ Kn. Similarly, we can derive that Nonce n 0 ∈ Kn. We then introduce the notion of observational equivalence between messages which is naturally defined as the negation of message distinguishability. If an agent cannot distinguish two messages m and m , then the two messages are observationally equivalent to the agent. msgEq::"msg set⇒msg⇒msg⇒bool"
"msgEq Know m1 m2 ≡ (m1, m2) ∈ Diff Know"
Obviously, observational equivalence between messages w.r.t. a knowledge set K n is reflexive, symmetric and transitive, which are captured by the following three lemmas. 
Alignment between message sequences
An immediate idea is to lift the observation equivalence directly to two message sequences by imposing the requirement that each corresponding message pair in the two sequences should be observationally equivalent. However, it is subtle to define the observational equivalence between two message sequences. For instance, there are two runs msgSq and msgSq of a protocol, as shown in Table 1 In order to define observational equivalence between two traces (see Sect. 6), we propose an additional requirement, called "alignment", on two message sequences. The intuitive idea of our alignment requirement is that the relation, composed of corresponding message pairs in two message sequences, should be single-valued. Alignment requires that a message should have only one interpretation when we map messages from a message sequence to the other message sequence. Furthermore, single-valued requirement should remain valid after applying the analyzing operation (e.g., decryption and separation) and synthesizing operation (e.g., encryption and concatenation) pair-wisely on the message pairs in the two message lists of the two message sequences. This matches well with the reinterpretation function as defined in [GHPvR05] .
From Examples 3 to 5, we use two message sequences msgSq and msgSq to explain the above two requirements. Below n 0 , n 1 , n 0 , n 1 are pairwise different nonces.
Example 3
If priK B and priK B are not compromised, then msgSq and msgSq as shown in Table 2 are different, as the intruder can decrypt the first and second messages and compare them with the third and fourth messages in the above message sequences. (After applying the decryption operation to the first messages pairwise in the two message sequences, the intruder obtains a new pair ({|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B , {|Nonce n 1 |} pubK B ). But this pair and ({|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B , {|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B ) contradicts with the single-valued requirement.)
Example 4
If priK B and priK B and priK M are not compromised, then msgSq and msgSq as shown in Table 3 are different, as the intruder can encrypt the third and fourth messages and compare them with the first and second messages in the above two sequences. (After applying the encryption operation to third messages pairwisely in the two message sequences, the intruder obtains a new pair of the following form ({|{|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B |} pubK M , {|{|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B |} pubK M ). But this pair and ({|{|Nonce n 0 |} pubK B |} pubK M , {|{|Nonce n 1 |} pubK B |} pubK M ) contradicts with the single-valued requirement.) 
{|Nonce n 1 |} pubK B Table 3 . Two non-alignment message sequences for Example 4 msgSq msgSq
Example 5 If priK B and priK B and priK M are not compromised, msgSq and msgSq as shown in Table 4 should be equivalent w.r.t. an intruder as all the messages cannot be analyzed and the linkage of messages in a trace cannot be established.
More formally, we first inductively define two more operators analz pairs and synth pairs to formalize the pairwise analyzing and synthesizing operations on the message pairs between two sets of message pairs. ⇒ (Crypt k x, Crypt k x')∈synth pairs r Kn" 
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The following lemma gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a function mapping, which is naturally derived from synth pairs r Kn provided that r is single-valued. 
Observational equivalence between traces
Now we can lift observational equivalence to traces with the concepts of observational equivalence between messages and alignment between two message sequences: two sequences of messages in two traces look the same to an observer if a message in one sequence is observationally equivalent to the corresponding message in the other sequence w.r.t. the knowledge which the observer has obtained from the two traces. Besides the requirement on the message parts of the two traces, we require that the sender and receiver of an event in one trace is the same as those of the corresponding event in the other trace. For events ev 1 and ev 2 , we define SRMatch ev 1 ev 2 ≡ (sender ev 1 sender ev 2 ) ∧ (receiver ev 1 receiver ev 2 ). For two traces tr and tr , SRMatchL tr tr ≡ length tr length tr ∧ ∀ i .i < length tr −→ SRMatch tr i tr i . The predicate SRMatchL tr tr means that each event tr i has the same sender and receiver as its corresponding event tr i and the two traces have the same length.
Two traces tr and tr are observationally equivalent (tr ≈ A tr ), if the following conditions are satisfied:
• tr and tr have the same length; and for all events in tr i , the senders and receivers of tr i are the same as those of tr i .
• msgPart tr i and msgPart tr i are observationally equivalent w.r.t. the knowledge obtained after observing the two traces.
• single valued r and single valued r −1 guarantee that an agent cannot reinterpret any event differently, where r (r −1 ) is the sequence of message pairs obtained from tr and tr (tr and tr ) after applying the operations analz pairs and synth pairs.
The corresponding formalization in Isabelle/HOL is given below. Remark 1 In the work of Garcia et al. [GHPvR05] , a reinterpretation function between two message sequences is used as an underlining concept. However, no one has formally argued when such a function exists and how it can be derived. In our work, the alignment requirement between the two message sequences gives a sufficient condition for the existence of a reinterpretation function. Moreover, the two operators analz pairs and synth pairs give a mechanical way to derive such a function. Note that if both single valued r and single valued (r −1 ), we can naturally construct a bijection function between the domain of r to its range.
Epistemic operators and anonymity properties
Using the observational equivalence relations over a trace set of possible worlds, we can formally introduce epistemic operators [GHPvR05] as follows:
constdefs box::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool" "box A tr trs Assert≡ ∀ tr'.tr'∈trs−→obsEquiv A tr tr' −→(Assert tr')" constdefs diamond::"agent⇒trace⇒trace set⇒ assertOfTrace⇒bool" "diamond A tr trs Assert≡ ∃tr'.tr'∈trs ∧obsEquiv A tr tr' ∧(Assert tr')"
For notation convenience, we write tr | A trs ϕ for box A tr trs ϕ, and tr | ♦ A trs ϕ for diamond A tr trs ϕ. Note that ϕ is a predicate on a trace. Intuitively, tr | A trs ϕ means that for any trace tr in trs, if tr is observationally equivalent to tr for agent A, then tr satisfies the assertion ϕ. On the other hand, tr | ♦ A trs ϕ means that there is a trace tr in trs, tr is observationally equivalent to tr for agent A and tr satisfies the assertion ϕ. Now we can formulate some information hiding properties in our epistemic language. We use the standard notion of an anonymity set: it is a collection of agents among which a given agent is not identifiable. The larger this set is, the more anonymous an agent is.
Sender anonymity
Suppose that tr is a trace of a protocol in which a message m is originated by some agent. We say that tr provides sender anonymity w.r.t. the anonymity set AS and a set of possible runs in the view of B if it satisfies the following condition:
constdefs senderAnomity::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool" "senderAnomity AS B m tr trs≡ (∀ X.X∈AS−→ tr | ♦B trs (originates X m))"
Here, AS is the set of agents who are under consideration, and trs is the set of all the traces which B can observe. Intuitively, this definition means that each agent in AS can originate m in a trace of trs. Therefore, this means that B cannot be sure of anyone who originates this message.
Unlinkability
We say that a trace tr provides unlinkability for user A and a message m w.r.t. the anonymity set AS if constdefs unlinkability::"agent set⇒agent⇒msg⇒ trace⇒trace set⇒bool" "unlinkability AS A m tr trs≡ (let P= λX m' tr. originates X m' tr in (¬(tr | Spy trs (P A m))) ∧ senderAnomity AS A m tr trs
where the left side of the conjunction means that the intruder is not certain whether A has sent the message m, while the right side means that every other user could have sent m. All the definitions, lemmas, and proofs in this section are implemented in a formal theory anonymity.thy, which provides a mechanized library for anonymity protocol analysis. This theory comprises 2,462 lines. Its execution needs only 40 s. We make these Isabelle codes available at [Li] . Our experiments are performed on the 64-bit Isabelle-2012 version, which is run on the Sugon 64-bit computing server platform which has a 160-multicore Intel Xeon CPU with 2.40 GHz.
Case study I: Crowds
The Crowds system [RR98] is a system for performing anonymous web transactions based on the idea that anonymity can be provided by hiding in a crowd. For simplicity reasons, we only model the request part as specified in [GHPvR05] : when an agent wants to send a request to a server, he randomly selects a user from a crowd of users and asks this user to forward the request for him to the server; and this user then either forwards the request to the server, or selects another random user from the crowd to do the forwarding. The specification of Crowds is shown as below: In the above formalization, rule crowdNil specifies an empty trace. The other rules specify trace's extension with protocol steps. More precisely,
• rule CrowdsInit models that an agent A, who is not the Server, originates a requests. Here, we model new requests as fresh nonces. The agent randomly selects a user R from a crowd of users and asks this user to forward the request for him to the Server; • rule CrowdsRelay specifies that a relay R selects another random user R again from the crowd to do the forwarding. Here, we simply require that R is not the Server; • rule CrowdsSend models that a relay R forwards the request to the Server. Here, the requirement ∀ R .Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr specifies that no other user has sent the request to the Server before.
The following lemma simply states the fact that a request forwarded to the server must be initiated by an agent before.
Lemma 5 [[tr ∈ Crowds; Says R Server (Nonce n) ∈ set tr ]] ⇒ ∃ A B.Says A B {|Agent Server, Nonce n|} ∈ set tr Suppose that there exists an event Says A B {|Agent Server, Nonce n|} occurring in a trace tr , then there exist two subtrace tr 1 and tr 2 , two agents A and B such that tr tr 1 @(Says A B {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#tr 2 ) and the subtrace tr 2 does not contain any event whose message is of the form {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}. We can prove it simply by induction on tr . By the above two lemmas, and since {|Agent Server, Nonce n|} does not occur in tr 2 , thus we can know that the agent A originates the nonce n.
Lemma 6 [[Says
Assume that tr tr 1 @Says A B {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#tr 2 is a trace in Crowds, and the message {|Agent Server, Nonce n|} does not occur in tr 2 . Namely, A is the agent who originates the request {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}. We can add a new event Says A A {|Agent Server, Nonce n|} before tr 2 . Then the new trace tr 1 @(Says A B {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#Says A A {|Agent Server, Nonce n|}#tr 2 is still a valid trace in Crowds. This is formulated in the next lemma, which is crucial to prove sender anonymity for agent A as another agent A seems possible for the observer to initiate the request as well. This is due to the fact that the newly constructed trace is valid in the Crowds system. Suppose that the Server receives a request (identified by a nonce Nonce n), then the Server cannot be sure of which agent originates the request. That is to say, the sender anonymity holds for the Server w.r.t any anonymity agent set not containing the Server.
Lemma 9 [[tr
The sender anonymity comes from the local view of the agent Server, and the nondeterministic choice of a relay who either forwards a request again or directly sends the request to the Server. However, for the Spy, who observes the global network traffic, the sender anonymity does not hold. Namely, the Spy can be sure of the agent who originates a request. This can be formalized and proved as Lemma 10. 
Case study II: Onion Routing
Onion Routing [GRS96, SGR97] provides both sender and receiver anonymity for communication over the Internet and servers as the basis of the Tor network [DMS04] . Its main idea is based on Chaum's mix cascades [Cha81] that messages in Onion Routing have a layered encryption (thus called onions) and travel from source to destination via a sequence of proxies (called onion routers). Each onion router can decrypt (or peel) one layer of a received message and forward the remainder to the next onion router. In order to disguise the relations between incoming and outgoing messages, an onion router collects incoming messages until it has received k messages, and then permutes the messages and sends in batch to their intended receivers.
Modeling Onion Routing
In this paper, we model a simplified version of Onion Routing with only one onion router as done in [GHPvR05] . We assume a set of users AS and one router M , with M ∈ AS . We also assume that each agent can send a message before the router M launches a batch of forwarding process, and the router does not accept any message when it is forwarding. In the above specification of Onion Routing, there are four induction rules. Rule onionNil specifies an empty trace. The other rules specify trace's extension with protocol steps. The ideas behind these induction rules (onionCons1, onionCons2, onionCons3) are explained as follows.
• If the length of the current trace is less than i , namely, M is still in the receiving status, X (or Y ) and M are distinct, and both n 0 and n are fresh, an event Says X M {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M can be added. This step means that X sends a message to M which will later be peeled and forwarded to Y by M .
• If the length of the current trace is less than i , X and M are distinct, and n is fresh, then we can add an event Says X M {|NonceN |} pubK M . This means that X sends a dummy message to M which will later be simply discarded.
• If the length of the current trace is greater than or equal to i , this means that M is in the forwarding status, and if a received message of the form {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M has not been forwarded by the router yet, then we can add an event Says M Y {|Nonce n|} pubK Y . This step means that the router M forwards the peeled message to Y .
In our analysis, the intruder is passive in the sense that the spy (intruder) will not modify the network traffic. An active intruder can easily infer the receiver of a message m forwarded to some agent. He only needs to intercept any other message except for the message m, and replace them by dummy messages. Because all dummy messages will be discarded by the router, and only m will be peeled and forwarded to the intended receiver.
An overview our proof strategy
In the following sections, we will formalize and prove the anonymity properties of Onion Routing. Due to the complexity of the epistemic operators in property definitions, the proof is rather complicated. We give an overview of our formalization and the main proof steps.
We will formalize the sender anonymity and unlinkabilty of Onion Routing in the view of a Spy for a trace tr w.r.t. a set of honest agents and all possible traces. According to the definitions of epistemic operators, which are used in the definition of sender anonymity and unlinkability, we need to construct another trace tr which satisfies the following two conditions:
(1) tr is still an Onion Routing trace, namely, tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(2) tr is observationally equivalent to tr . That is to say, obsEquiv Spy tr tr . In order to show this, by the definition of obsEquiv, we need to prove four conditions. The first two conditions are straightforward, but the latter two are rather difficult: (i) msgPart tr i and msgPart tr i for any i < length tr are observationally equivalent w.r.t. the knowledge obtained after observing the two traces; (ii) the alignment requirements single valued r and single valued r −1 where r is the sequence of message pairs obtained from tr and tr after applying the operations analz pairs and synth pairs. Section 9.4 formally introduces a function swap ma mb tr , which servers the purpose of constructing such an equivalent trace tr . Here ma, mb are the messages sent to the router in the trace tr . Section 9.4.1 gives its formal definition and proves simple correspondence properties of the swap function. Section 9.4.2 proves the first condition (1). Section 9.4.3 devotes to the proof of the condition (2-ii), and Section 9.4.4 proves the condition (2-i), then completes the proof of (2). In order to prove (2-i), we need to prove properties such as secrecy and correspondence properties of Onion Routing, which are discussed in Sect. 9.3. After these, we finish the proofs of the two anonymity properties in Sect. 9.5.
Properties on protocol sessions
As mentioned before, whether two traces are observationally equivalent for an agent depends on the knowledge of the agent after his observation of the two traces. Therefore, we need to discuss some properties on the knowledge of the intruder. They are secrecy properties, and some regularity on the correspondence of the events in one protocol session of Onion Routing.
Correspondence properties
The following lemma is about the correspondence of two events in a trace tr . If the router M forwards a message {|Nonce n|} pubK Y , then there exists an agent A who has sent {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M .
If {|Nonce n|} pubK Y is a submessage of a message which A sends to the router M , then {|Nonce n|} pubK Y is originated by A.
Lemma 12 [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; ma
{|Nonce n|} pubK Y ; Says A M ma ∈ set tr ; ma ma]] ⇒ originates A ma tr
Uniqueness properties
Since an agent is required to originate fresh nonces when he sends a message to the router, thus if two events where agents send a message to the router M , either two events are exactly the same, or nonces used in the two events are disjoint.
Lemma 13 [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ; Says X M ma; Says Y M mb]] ⇒ (X Y ∧ ma mb) ∨ (noncesOf ma ∩ noncesOf mb) ∅
From Lemma 13, we can easily derive that once a nonce n occurs in a message sent by an agent X , then another agent Y cannot originate a message containing the same nonce n.
As a consequence, the message of each event in a trace of the protocol is unique, namely two messages in two events in this trace are different.
Lemma 15 [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ]] ⇒ map msgPart tr ∈ distinctList
With the above lemma, we can derive that the relation (zip (map msgPart tr ) sq) must be single valued if tr is in a trace of Onion Routing. Here, we use sq to indicate a message sequence of the same length. msgPart tr ) sq) 
Lemma 16 [[tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ]] ⇒ single valued (zip (map
Secrecy properties
First we need to introduce a new predicate:
Predicate nonLeakMsg m M specifies that if a message m is of the form Crypt (pubK M ){|Nonce n 0 , Agent B , Crypt (pubK B )(Nonce n)|}, then either B ∈ bad or n 0 n. This specifies a non-leakage condition of nonce part n 0 in a message of the form Crypt (pubK M ){|Nonce n 0 , Agent B , Crypt (pubK B )(Nonce n)|} which is sent to the router even if whose nonce part n will be forwarded to the intruder. The following lemma will explain the intuition behind this definition. If both the router M and an agent B are honest, and B sends {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M to M , and nonLeakMsg ma M also holds, then Nonce n 0 cannot be analyzed by the intruder. 
Message swapping
By its definition, to prove sender anonymity of an agent X in a trace tr , we need to show the existence of an observationally equivalent trace tr . In this section, we present a method for the construction of an observationally equivalent trace.
The swap function
We first define a function swap ma mb tr , which returns another trace tr satisfying the following conditions: (1) the sender and receiver of any event tr i in trace tr are the same as in the corresponding event tr i in tr ; (2) the message of any event in tr is swapped as mb if the message of the corresponding event in tr is ma; (3) the message of any event in tr is swapped as ma if the message of the corresponding event in tr is mb; (4) otherwise the message is kept unchanged. Let tr swap ma mb tr . In Lemma 19, part 1 says that the message of the event tr i is almost the same as that of tr i except the case when the message is ma or mb. If the message sent in tr i is ma, then the counterpart in tr i is mb, and vice versa. Part 2 says that each sender and receiver of each event tr i is the same as those of tr i . Part 3 shows that swap ma mb tr has the same length as tr . Part 4 says that messages observed from tr is the same as those of swap ma mb tr . Part 5 shows that the trace swap ma mb tr is the same as swap ma mb tr . Part 6, part 7, part 8, and part 9 show some correspondence of an event occurring in tr and the corresponding one in tr . Part 10 and part 11 show that if Says A M ma ∈ tr , and Says B M mb ∈ tr , for Spy, the set of messages and knowledge obtained from tr is the same as those from swap ma mb tr . Part 12 says that nonces of mb will be disjoint from those of used tr if nonces of ma are disjoint from those of mb, nonces of ma are disjoint from used tr , nonceDisj mb tr , and nonces of ma are not empty. Part 13 says that nonces of m will be disjoint from those of used tr if nonces of m are disjoint from those of ma, nonces of m are disjoint from those of mb, and nonces of ma are disjoint from used tr .
swap ma mb tr is an Onion Routing trace
We first define a predicate nonceDisjUntil ma tr stating that nonces of ma are disjoint with any other message occurring in any tr such that tr is a prefix of the trace tr with length of tr ≤ i . The next predicate isRouterRecvMsg m M specifies that m is a message sent to the router M . Within this subsection, when we mention ma and mb (see lemmas below), we always mean that they satisfy the predicates isRouterRecvMsg ma M and isRouterRecvMsg mb M . The predicate bothContained specifies that both ma and mb are contained in the messages of tr if the length of tr ≥ i . definition bothContained::"trace ⇒ msg ⇒ msg ⇒ nat ⇒ agent ⇒ bool" where "bothContained tr ma mb i M ≡ length tr ≥ i −→ ((∃ X . Says X M ma ∈ set tr) ∧ (∃ X. Says X M mb ∈ set tr))"
Next lemma specifies an invariant on a trace tr in oneOnionSession i M , if both ma and mb are messages sent to the router M , nonces of ma and mb are disjoint, nonces of ma (mb) are disjoint with any other message in any prefix tr of tr whose length is less than or equal to i , both ma and mb are contained in the messages of tr with a length ≥ i , then swap ma mb tr is also a trace in oneOnionSession i M .
Proof. We apply induction to prove the lemma, and four subgoals will be generated. For notational convenience, we define the following abbreviations for the conclusion of this lemma: P ≡ λ tr .bothContained tr ma mb i M −→ nonceDisjUntil ma tr i −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr i −→ swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . 2. Case onionCons1: Given a trace tr , agents X , Y , nonces n 0 , n such that tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M , X M , Y M , Nonce n 0 ∈ used tr , Nonce n ∈ used tr , and length tr < i , and the induction hypothesis (abbrv. IH) P tr, let tr Says X M {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|} (pubK M ) #tr , now we need to show P tr . In order to prove this, we only need assume bothContained tr ma mb i M , nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i , then show swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . First, by length tr < i , bothContained tr ma mb i M trivially holds. From nonceDisjUntil ma tr i , by Lemma 21 we also have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i . Similarly, we have nonceDisjUntil mb tr i . With P tr, we have (1) swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . Now we do case analysis on the newly added message m
, there are three cases in total:
(a) m ma. Notice that swap ma mb tr Says X M mb#swap ma mb tr . We can easily show nonces ma ∩ used tr ∅, because of nonces ma {n, n 0 }. With the premises (noncesOf ma) ∩ (noncesOf mb) ∅, and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i , by Lemma 19-(12) we have (2) used (swap ma mb tr ) ∩ nonces mb ∅. From isRouterRecvMsg mb M , then we have two sub-cases:
, we have Nonce n 0 ∈ used (swap ma mb tr ), Nonce n ∈ used (swap ma mb tr ). With (1), by rule onionCons1, we can have swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
(a-2) or mb Crypt (pubK M )(Nonce n ) for some n . From (2), we have Nonce n ∈ used (swap ma mb tr ).
With (1), by rule onionCons2, we can have swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . 4. Case onionCons3: Given a trace tr , agents X , Y , nonces n 0 , n such that tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M ,
Nonce n) ∈ set tr , i ≤ length tr , and induction hypothesis P tr. Now we need to show P tr where tr Says M Y {|Nonce n|} (pubK M ) #tr . In order to prove this, we only assume bothContained tr ma mb i M , nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i , then show swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . Let t {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|} (pubK M ) , and t Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n). Notice that isRouterRecvMsg ma M , and isRouterRecvMsg mb M , then we have t ma and t mb. Therefore, (3) swap ma mb tr Says M Y t #swap ma mb tr . Furthermore from t ma and t mb, and bothContained tr ma mb i M , we can easily have (4) bothContained tr ma mb i M . From nonceDisjUntil ma tr i , by Lemma 21, we have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i . Similarly, we have nonceDisjUntil mb tr i . With P tr, we have (5) swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . Now we perform case analysis on t , there are three cases in total:
(a) t ma. From (4) and i ≤ length tr , we have Says X M mb ∈ set tr for some agent X , then by Lemma 19-(7), we have (6) Says X M t ∈ swap ma mb tr . From Says M Y t ∈ set tr , by Lemma 19-(9), we have Says M Y t ∈ set (swap ma mb tr ). With (5) (6), we can easily conclude swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . (b) t mb. Similar to Case (a). (c) Neither t ma nor t mb. With Says X M t ∈ set tr , by Lemma 19-(8), we have Says X M t ∈ set (swap ma mb tr ). Similar to the argument in case (a), we have Says M Y t ∈ set (swap ma mb tr ). Therefore, with (5) (6), we can easily conclude swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
Lemma 22 is rather complex, we must consider two cases: (1) length tr < i ; or (2) length tr ≥ i . For cases (1), we mainly need to consider when ma (mb) occurs in trace tr , then mb (ma) occurs in swap ma mb. In order to make the swap ma mb satisfy the rule onionCons1 or onionCons2, mb (ma) should be in a form which is sent to the router M -these are guaranteed by conditions isRouterRecvMsg ma M and isRouterRecvMsg mb M . Besides, the nonces created in mb (ma) should be fresh; this is the reason why premises nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i are needed. In fact, for case (1), we do not need to require that both ma and mb occur in tr , we can replace ma with a new message which contains fresh nonces which are disjoint with nonces of tr . However, for case (2), we have to require that both ma and mb should occur in tr , as ma occurs in tr and the peeled messages of ma and ma also occur in tr . We notice that ma also occurs in swap ma mb tr by the definition of swap, in order to make the swap ma mb satisfy the rule onionCons3. We must require that ma should also occur in swap ma mb tr , thus mb should also occur in tr .
Based on Lemmas 20 and 22, we conclude an important result: for a trace tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M , if both ma and mb are sent to the router M by some agent, then swap ma mb tr is still in oneOnionSession i M . This lemma accurately captures the intuition of the function swap which is explained in Fig. 1 .
Proof. From the premises that Says A M ma ∈ tr and Says B M mb ∈ tr , it is trivial to prove that the predicate bothContained tr ma mb i M . We have that they are both messages sent to the router M . Thus the messages ma and mb satisfy that isRouterRecvMsg ma M and isRouterRecvMsg mb M . By Lemma 20, we have nonceDisjUntil ma tr i and nonceDisjUntil mb tr i . By Lemma 22, we conclude that swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M .
In fact, initially, we want to directly prove the lemma directly by induction. However, during the proof procedure, we find that we must face the case where only ma (or mb) occurs in tr , therefore we must strengthen the premises of the lemma, therefore Says A M ma(mb) ∈ set tr is replaced by the premises isRouterRecvMsg ma(mb) M and nonceDisjUntil ma tr i . When length tr ≥ i , we must require that both ma and mb must occur in tr because the swap function will not replace any message which is sent by the router. Therefore premises bothContained tr ma mb i M is added into premises. These are typical techniques involved when we use induction proof method. We need retune the induction assertion, and the key point is that the retuned one can be proved in each induction case.
Alignment properties
By Lemma 16, we can show that the relation, composed of two messages sequences of message parts of tr and swap ma mb tr , is single valued. Notice that conditions nonLeakMsg ma M and nonLeakMsg mb M guarantee the correctness of na 0 and some nonce part of mb, which in turn guarantees the observational equivalence between ma and mb.
Next we show that swap ma mb tr is observationally equivalent to tr if tr satisfies some constraints. If ma {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M , ma is sent to the router M by an honest agent A, and mb is also sent to the router M by an honest agent B , then tr is observationally equivalent to swap ma mb tr in the view of the Spy. (2) 
Proving anonymity properties
Let us give two preliminary definitions: the senders in a trace is defined as senders tr M ≡ {A. ∃ m.Says A M m ∈ set tr }, a predicate nonLeakTrace tr M ≡ ∀ A n 0 n Y .Says A M m ∈ set tr −→ A ∈ bad −→ nonLeakMsg m tr specifying that tr is a trace where each honest agent sends a message satisfying nonLeakMsg m tr.
Message ma is forwarded to B by the router M , and is originated by some honest agent, and the trace satisfies nonLeakMsg m tr, then Spy cannot be sure of the honest agent who originates ma if Spy is an observer. Namely, the sender anonymity holds for the intruder w.r.t. the honest agents who send messages to M in the session modeled by tr . Proof. By unfolding the definition of the predicate senderAnomity, for any agent X ∈ (senders tr M − bad), fix an agent X , we need to construct a trace tr such that tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M and obsEquiv Spy tr tr and originates X ma tr . From Says M B ma ∈ set tr , by Lemma 11, there exists A and n 0 , such that Says A M {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M ∈ set tr . By Lemma 12, we have originates A ma tr . Obviously, by the fact regularOrig ma tr , we have A ∈ bad. From the fact X ∈ (senders tr M − bad), by the definition of senders, there exists an event Says X M mb ∈ set tr , X M , X ∈ bad. Let ma {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M . By nonLeakTrace tr M n, we have both nonLeakMsg ma M and nonLeakMsg mb M . Let tr swap ma mb tr , by Lemma 30, we have obsEquiv Spy tr (swap ma mb tr ). By Lemma 23, we have swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . From the fact Says X M mb ∈ set tr , by part 6 in Lemma 19, we have Says X M ma ∈ swap ma mb tr . By Lemma 12, we have originates X ma (swap ma mb tr ).
The last result is about the linkability of a sender A and a peeled onion ma. Suppose that an honest agent A sends a message m to the router M , and an agent B receives a message ma from M , the intruder cannot link the message ma with the agent A provided that there exists at least one agent X who is not A and sends a message to M . From the premise, there exist X and mx such that Says X M mx ∈ set tr , X A, and X ∈ bad . From Says M B ma ∈ set tr , by Lemma 11, there exists a message m, an agent A , a nonce n 0 , such that ma has the form of Says A M {|Nonce n 0 , Agent Y , {|Nonce n|} pubK Y |} pubK M ∈ set tr . Obviously, by the fact regularOrig ma tr , we have A ∈ bad. In order to prove (1), by unfolding the definition of the diamond operator, we only need construct a trace tr such that obsEquiv Spy tr tr and ¬originates A ma tr . Here we do case analysis on A .
If A A, then (1) can be proved immediately. Obviously obsEquiv Spy tr tr , tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . By Lemma 14, we have ¬originates A ma tr . Otherwise, from A A, we have X A . let tr swap ma mx tr , by Lemma 30, we have obsEquiv Spy tr tr . By Lemma 23, we have tr ∈ oneOnionSession i M . From Says X M mx ∈ set tr and Says A M ma ∈ set tr , by Lemma 6, we have Says X M ma ∈ set tr and Says A M mx ∈ set tr . From X A, by Lemma 14, immediately we have ¬originates A ma tr .
Analyzing the Onion Routing protocol took us about one month's effort. This time is much longer because for this protocol we need more time to figure out a new proof technique. The proof script comprises 5,593 lines and executes in one minute.
A weakness of the protocol
Here, we show a weakness of the onion routing protocol, which is hinted by the premise nonLeakTrace tr M . Namely, without this condition, the sender anonymity and unlinkability may not hold. For example, consider the session shown in Fig. 1 , the trace tr in (1) is not observationally equivalent to that in (2) 
Conclusion
We have formalized the notion of provable anonymity in the theorem prover Isabelle/HOL. The inductive approach is one of the most important techniques we adopted. We proposed an inductive definition of message distinguishability based on the observer's knowledge, then defined message equivalence as the negation of message distinguishability. Next, we inductively define the alignment relation between message sequences, which is a key factor to construct a reinterpretation function on which the observational equivalence between traces is based. In the end, we inductively formalize the semantics of Crowds and Onion Routing, and formally prove anonymity properties for the protocols in our formal framework, i.e., sender anonymity for Crowds, sender anonymity and unlikability for Onion Routing. The inductive approach helps us to define the semantics of observational equivalence, and protocol semantics as well. Correspondingly the inductive proof method is the most effective one to reason about the properties of the inductively defined semantics of anonymity protocols. Therefore, selecting a proper proof assistant is important which has built-in support for the inductive approach, which will make it feasible to mechanize all the theory in the theorem prover. Our choice is Isabelle, which plays a key role in our formalization.
When we prove that anonymity properties, e.g., sender anonymity, hold for a trace under consideration, we need manually to construct the existence of another trace which is observationally equivalent to the given trace, but differs, for example, in the sender of some message. This is the essence of information hiding on the senders or the linkage between a message and its sender, which makes the analysis of anonymity different from analysis on secrecy and authentication. For secrecy and authentication, normally the focus is on individual traces. However, the observer decides whether two traces are observationally equivalent according to his knowledge obtained in two traces, which usually boils down to the secrecy of some terms. Therefore, the induction proof method used in the analysis of secrecy properties can still be applied here. Techniques such as case distinction, induction, calculational reasoning in the Isar language can make our proof structured, which are immensely more readable and maintainable than apply-scripts. But the price we pay is that the length of proof in Isar is usually much longer than that of the counterpart in Isabelle tactical style. Therefore, we adopt a mixed style in our formalized proofs: we use commands in the Isar style to decompose a large goal into subgoals to keep our proof with a clear structure; when a subgoal is simple enough, we directly use apply-scripts to prove the subgoal, thus we can keep the length of our proof script relatively short. After processing a proof command, Isabelle will display a proof state: Namely, if we want to prove P tr for any trace tr ∈ oneOnionSession M i. We first need to prove P []; second we need to prove P tr ⇒ P (ev #tr ), where ev is an event ev added into the trace tr which is defined according to the rules onionCons1-onionCons3.
In the following discussions, we show how to formally prove Lemma 22 in Isabelle. First we need to write a lemma to specify the proof goal by a lemma command. For Lemma 22, we define it in Isabelle as follows: lemma trace invariant: assumes a1:"tr:oneOnionSession k M" and a2:"(noncesOf ma) ∧ (noncesOf mb) =∅" and a3:"isRouterRecvMsg ma M" and a4: "isRouterRecvMsg mb M" shows " bothContained tr ma mb k M−→ nonceDisjUntil ma tr k −→nonceDisjUntil mb tr k −→ (swap ma mb tr: oneOnionSession k M)" (is "P tr")
After defining the lemma, we need to ask Isabelle to assist us to prove the goal, and use the command using a1 proof induct to apply the induction rule oneOnionSession.induct to solve the goal. The premise tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M will be eliminated. Note that the property P under consideration in this lemma is "λ tr .bothContained tr ma mb k M −→ nonceDisjUntil ma trk −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr k −→ swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M ". According to the definition of oneOnionSession.induct, four proof goals will be automatically generated by Isabelle. Here we only present the second one:
2. tr X Y n0 n.
[[tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M; noncesOf ma ∧ noncesOf mb = ∅; isRouterRecvMsg ma M; isRouterRecvMsg mb M; bothContained tr ma mb k M−→nonceDisjUntil ma tr k −→ nonceDisjUntil mb tr k −→ swap ma mb tr ∈ oneOnionSession k M; X M; Y M; Nonce n0 ∈ used tr; Nonce n ∈ used tr; length tr Notice that the fifth premise is the induction hypothesis P tr, and the conclusion to be shown is P (Says X M {|Nonce n0, Agent Y , Crypt (pubK Y ) (Nonce n)|} (pubK M ) #tr ). From the above, we can see that this lemma is not trivial, and the proof obligations involved are rather complex. Isabelle can help us in an induction proof: selecting proper induction rule to execute, generating subgoals for base case and induction steps. It is error-prone for human to perform these tasks. However, Isabelle/Isar can automatically finish these tasks in a mechanical way. After the subgoals are created, our proof structure is naturally decomposed into four parts: one for the base case onionNil, the other three for the induction cases: onionCons1-onionCons3.
Besides, for the typical proof techniques of using case analysis as shown in the proof of Lemma 22, we use Isar commands for calculational reasoning to perform the proof of all case analysis. Thanks to the Isar proof script language provided by Isabelle, the mechanical proof structure has a similar structure as the one shown in Sect. 9.4.2.
